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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to generate a tactical decision aid (TDA) capable of 
calculating the probability of kill of a submarine when targeted with a vertical launched 
(VLA) anti-submarine rocket propelled torpedo (ASROC). In determining the submarine 
specific probability of kill (Pk), the Passive Contact Tracker and Kill Probability (PACT-
AKP) TDA calculates the submarine’s position and its area of uncertainty (AOU) based 
on single or multiple ASW passive sensor bearing-to-target inputs.  
In determining the target’s position and AOU, PACT-AKP employs an extended 
Kalman Filter that uses MTST movement and measurement models. In calculating 
ASROC probability of kill, submarine specific torpedo specific effectiveness (TEFF) data 
collected from NUWC Newport was used to generate the Pk algorithm.   
We can conclude that PACT-AKP not only assists the ASW team with target 
motion analysis (TMA), but also provides the commander with a credible target 
probability of kill prior to the employment of VLA ASROC torpedoes as a deliberate 
attack weapon.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
With limited weapon payload and increasing number of potential threat 
submarines, if the U.S. surface fleet is to contribute to maintaining maritime dominance 
the submarine threat must be met with the prudent and effective use of anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) munitions. This thesis explores and solves a current and tactically critical 
ASW problem that plagues the surface navy fleet; the probability of kill of a submarine 
when engaged with a vertical launched (VLA) anti-submarine rocket propelled light 
weight torpedo (ASROC). This thesis develops the passive contact tracker and 
probability of kill (PACT-AKP), an EXCEL-based Microsoft Windows platform tactical 
decision aid (TDA) designed to aid in the passive tracking of a target and more 
importantly, to determine the target’s probability of kill when engaged with a VLA 
ASROC.  
PACT-AKP only requires the user to enter passive contact information normally 
recorded and processed during passive target motion analysis (TMA). Upon demand, 
PACT-AKP provides a graphical depiction of the submarine’s position, 2-sigma area of 
uncertainty (AOU) and ASROC probability of kill. In addition, PACT-AKP’s probability 
of kill feature is flexible enough so that it gives the user the ability to calculate the 
probability of kill without using the program’s passive contact tracker feature.    
Through use of Kalman filter theory and probability theory, this study provides a 
probability of kill for ASROC employment. Although numerous naval systems employ 
Kalman filters and its variations, what makes this thesis unique is the derivation of the 
probability of kill algorithm. Prior to this effort, there was no antecedent work tackling 
this problem. Anti-submarine warfare operations are complex and beset with uncertainty. 
Determining a submarine’s probability of kill when engaged with a VLA ASROC prior 
to the actual deliberate attack engagement provides the commander with the necessary 




shipboard ASW munitions. The probability of kill algorithm developed herein is unique 
and provides a foundation for the development of future Navy-wide ASW doctrine 
governing the use of ASROC munitions.    
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I. PACT-AKP  
A. INTRODUCTION 
With limited weapon payload and increasing number of submarines world wide, if 
the U.S. surface fleet is to continue to maintain maritime dominance the ASW threat must 
be met with the prudent and effective use of ASW munitions.  
This thesis explores and answers a current ASW problem facing the surface fleet, 
estimation of the probability of kill of a submarine when engaged with a vertical 
launched (VLA) anti-submarine rocket propelled light weight torpedo (ASROC).  
This thesis develops the passive contact tracker and probability of kill (PACT-
AKP), a Microsoft Windows platform tactical decision aid (TDA) designed to aid in the 
passive tracking of a target as well as to determine the target’s probability of kill when 
engaged with a VLA ASROC. 
B. BACKGROUND 
When faced with an ASW threat, both the commander and the ASW team should 
be equipped with readily available decision aids capable of providing valuable and 
practical information.  Passive tracking of a submarine using target motion analysis 
(TMA) is normally conducted by hand, however, this tedious method can be easily 
replaced or the process aided by a TDA. Moreover, the commander should also have the 
necessary information available to make an informed decision before engaging in the 
expenditure of the warship’s limited ASW munitions to neutralize the ASW threat.    
Because current inventories of VLA MK46 light weight torpedoes are low, 
determining the probability of kill for a hostile submarine is important. As defined by 
NTTP-3-21.33 Surface Torpedo Attack Tactics / Countermeasures / Evasion Manual, a 
deliberate attack is offensive in nature and it is a planned coordinated employment of 
firepower intended to destroy a hostile submarine. The most effective ASW weapon for 
the prevailing circumstance should be used. Due to the short employment ranges of 
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surface vessel torpedo tube (SVTT) launched torpedoes that requires maneuvering well 
within the lethality range of submarine torpedoes, VLAs should be used for deliberate 
attacks. Surface vessels equipped with MK-41 vertical launch systems and armed with 
ASROC torpedoes are the preferred surface platform for a deliberate attack due to their 
standoff weapon engagement ability.  
The surface fleet is challenged to realistically determine the probability of killing 
a submarine when engaged with a VLA ASROC. Despite popular belief, the “Pk” display 
on the OJ-452 console does not refer to probability of kill, but rather how well the 
underwater fire control system (UFCS) of the ANISQQ-89 integrated ASW system is 
tracking a target in terms of up-to-date bearing-to-target measurements.  The fleet is 
currently without a method for assessing kill probability for the actual weapon.  
During a major fleet exercise Valiant Shield 2006 (VS06), simulated VLA 
employment greatly exceeded actual magazine capacity. It was observed that surface 
escorts followed a policy of “classify with ordinance” or using a weapon in the water to 
determine if the contact was an actual submarine (Naval Mine and Anti-submarine 
Warfare Command, (Forthcoming)). VS06 not only identified a weapon misuse issue but 
also a problem with kill probability determination regarding the VLA ASROC weapon 
system. The following year, exercise Valiant Shield 2007 (VS07) produced similar 
results. As published in TM 3-21.1-08 Vertical Launch ASROC (VLA) Employment, 
escorts expended more simulated torpedoes than physically possible. Based on 
observations from VS06 and VS07, one of the logical conclusions is that commanders 
had to know how and when to use ASW weapons more prudently (NMAWC, 
(Forthcoming)).  However, without the ability to ascertain the success of the weapon 
engagement as measured by the probability of kill, the commander must necessarily 
make less than optimal weapon expenditure decisions.  
C. PURPOSE 
This thesis’ purpose is to create a TDA capable of assisting the antisubmarine 
warfare team with the passive sensor tracking of an ASW threat and assist the 
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commander in making prudent decisions regarding the employment of the VLA ASROC 
torpedoes by calculating the probability of kill (Pk).   
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
PACT-AKP requires the user to manually enter passive sensor bearing-to-target 
data normally used while conducting TMA. PACT-AKP then processes these inputs 
using an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) that employs a maneuvering target statistical 
tracker (MTST) movement and measurement model to estimate the position and velocity 
of the target. It graphically depicts the target’s area of uncertainty (AOU) as derived from 
the EKF process and calculates its probability of kill when engaged with either a MK-46 
or MK-54 ASROC.   
PACT-AKP uses unique submarine specific torpedo effectiveness (TEFF) data 
along with information derived from the EKF process to calculate the probability of kill.  
PACT-AKP’s kill probability algorithm uses TEFF data as determined by the Navy’s 
Weapon Analysis Facility (WAF) and published in TACD&E 00-20, 01-14, 02-11, 03-14 
and 06-XX . In this thesis, only unclassified data is used to demonstrate PACT-AKP. 
E.  BENEFITS OF PACT-AKP 
Although the use of Kalman filters for the purpose of TMA is not a novelty, what 
sets PACT-AKP apart from any other TDA in its class is its fleet-wide accessibility, 
portability and above all, its unique feature of determining probability of kill.    
PACT-AKP enhances the capabilities of the Surface Navy by providing an 
effective passive ASW tracking process, and provides the commander with invaluable 
insight regarding VLA ASROC engagement allowing the commander to make more 
informed tactical decisions. 
In addition, PACT-AKP’s kill probability algorithm can easily be updated as new 
weapon effectiveness data is made available and its target tracking capability is scalable 
with slight modification of its embedded visual basic (VBA) code. PACT-AKP enhances 
the surface fleet’s ability to employ the VLA ASROC weapon system. 
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II. PACT-AKP METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the underlying theory and computational 
methodology used by PACT-AKP to both passively track and determine the kill 
probability of a target if engaged with a VLA ASROC torpedo.  
Throughout this chapter symbols for vectors and matrices will be bold, scalars 
will be italic and “←” is the replacement symbol.  The superscript t on a matrix means 
“transpose.” 
B. METHODOLOGY 
PACT-AKP employs a variant of the Kalman filter to process user inputs in order 
to determine and project the state of the target from time t to time t + ∆t. This variant is 
the extended Kalman filter (EKF).   
A basic Kalman filter is a method for recursively updating an estimate μ of the 
state of a system by processing a succession of measurements Z. After each measurement 
step a new estimate is produced. In PACT-AKP, the measurement Z is bearing-to-target 
while μ is an estimate of X, the location of the target in Cartesian coordinates.  The 
associated covariance matrix Σ  is used in calculating the dimensions of a 2-Sigma 
Ellipse area of uncertainty (AOU). The dimensions of the semi-major and semi-minor 
axis of the ellipse, as well as the estimated target position, along with TEFF data, are 
used to calculate kill probability.   
C. EXTENDED KALMAN FILTER 
In a basic Kalman filter, the measurement Z is related to X through the 
equation Z = HX + V . Z is the bearing-to-target measurement, H is the measurement 
matrix that describes how the bearing measurement depends on the target state and V is 
are independent Gaussian errors associated with the sensor. Because the relationship 
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between the bearing measurement Z and the target state is non-linear, the matrix H is 
obtained by linearizing the non-linear function of Z.  The logic is as follows, if 
Z f = (X) + V then the approximation  , Z f≅ (μ) + H(X -μ) + V  where 
d  dfH = (X) / X | X = μ is the matrix of the first partial derivatives.  The non-linear 
function of the state variables is approximated by the first order terms of a Taylor series 
expansion about μ. Except for the fact that H depends on μ, the approximation is a linear 
function of X (Washburn, 2007).  
1. Maneuvering Target Statistical Tracker (MTST) 
The Maneuvering Target Statistical Tracker was developed by Daniel H. Wagner 
Associates in the early 1980s and was chosen by the Navy as a Standard Tracker for at-
sea targets. Currently, it is used in many tactical data systems, including the Global 
Command and Control System (GCCS) and Tomahawk Weapons Control System 
(TWCS). MTST builds upon the principles of Kalman filtering theory and makes the 
filtering process capable of processing non-linear measurements such as the ones 
associated with bearing-to-target measurements.  
In MTST, the state vector is a 4 x 1 matrix taking the following form: 







The extended Kalman filter used in PACT-AKP employs MTST movement and 
measurement models. Wagner (1989) explains in detail the mathematical theory behind 
each type of model. What makes the MTST models different from basic Kalman filtering 
are the particular formulations of the matrices , Q which are derived from the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck (O-U) process. The velocity components of the state vector are assumed to be 
independent Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes (Wagner, 1989; Washburn, 2007).  Both the 
movement model and measurement model are presented as applicable to PACT-AKP.  
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a. PACT-AKP MTST Movement Model 
PACT-AKP’s MTST movement model has two embedded parameters that 
match submarine specific operating characteristics, and a user input parameter that 
represents the time in between measurements (∆t). The embedded parameters are the 
relaxation time (τ) and the root mean squared (RMS) speed (s). These parameters are the 
fundamental building blocks of the MTST movement projection model and are embedded 
in PACT-AKP.  
The relaxation time (τ) is the average time a target travels on a particular 
heading before changing course. PACT-AKP assumes τ = 0.5 hrs. The RMS speed (s) is 
the average instantaneous speed of the submarine in knots. PACT-AKP assumes s = 7 
kts.  
To project the estimated state vector forward from time t to time t + ∆t, 
MTST uses the updates and← ← tμ Φμ  Σ ΦΣΦ + Q . The matrices Φ and Q are given 
by:  
2 2 2 2
2
  0     0 1   0     0
0     0   0   1   0   
 ; =
  0     00   0     0
0   0   0   0     0   
Where:
let .5 ,  where  has units of 
(1 ) , w
c s s nm hrs
b τ


















here  has units of .
exp ,  where  is unitless. 
2 (3 4 ) ,  where  has units of .
,  where  has units of .























c b b c
cbc c
c c b c︵ 1- ︶
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b. PACT-AKP MTST Measurement Model 
In the user interface of PACT-AKP, the user is required to enter bearing-
to-target observations (Z) and the associated passive sensor error. Z is then modeled as: 
Z = HX + V  
In PACT-AKP, H is a 1 x 4 matrix and the V ’s are independent Gaussian 
vectors with mean zero and a 1 x 1 covariance matrix R . The matrix R  is obtained by 
squaring the standard deviation of the measurement error of the bearing-to-target 
observation, as inputted by the user. The user is in all cases required to input the accuracy 
of each bearing, along with the bearing itself.     
 
 
Figure 1.   Single Station Measure the Bearing to a Target Located at (X, Y).1  
 
Figure 1 provides a visual basis for the derivation of H. The location of 
the target is t( )X, Y , with the observers (measuring stations / ships) located at known 
points ( )x, y . Let ( )
D, θ
be the true range and bearing from the observer to the submarine. 




⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . The measurement is a 
non-linear function of the state. Since:  
                                                 
1 All Figures and Tables within this thesis were created by the Author.  
(x, y) 





cos( ) sin( ) and ,  and since  does not depend on the
velocity component of ,   is [ sin( ) / ,  cos( )] / ,  0,  0]
d d




θ θ θ θ
θ θ  
Because both  and D
θ
 depend on the unknown state of the target, H must 
be evaluated by inserting the latest estimates of and D
θ
.  
The target state is updated following a well defined sequence of 
calculations: 
1. Calculate the Kalman Gain: ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
-1t tK = ΣH HΣH + R   
2. Calculate μ (post-observation state of the target): S←μ μ + K , where 
- ,  and  is the bearing to the expected target location.S Z θ θ=  
3. Calculate the post-observation covariance matrix: [ ]←Σ I - KH Σ , where I is the 
identity matrix. 
Wagner (1989) and Bailey (1992) further describe the EKF measurement 
model.  
c. PACT-AKP Initial Target Position Guess Entry  
PACT-AKP’s EKF requires a guess at the target’s state in order to get the 
filtering process started. The initial target position or “position guess” in PACT-AKP is 
entered by the user. The upper left 2 x 2 corner of the covariance of the target position is 
hard-coded into the program with the value 6.25 nm², which indicates that PACT-AKP 
assumes the initial target position guess is an “educated guess” and accurate to within 
approximately 5nm (2Sqrt(6.25)= 5).  This setting is PACT-AKP specific because the 
assumption is that when conducting passive TMA the operator will have a general idea of 
the bearing and distance of the target from the sensor by considering environmental 
conditions and sensor performance.    
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Like the initialΣ , the target position guess corresponds to μ at time 0. 
Once the later is inputted or initialized, all subsequent calculations correspond to either 
the movements or measurements.  
d. PACT-AKP Coordinate System 
Most of the filtering process that takes place using MTST is performed on 
a flat earth. PACT-AKP requires the user to enter all inputs concerning measuring station 
position and target position guess in spherical coordinates of latitude and longitude, 
PACT-AKP later converts these coordinates into the X and Y coordinate system.  
The coordinate system used to describe the position of the measuring 
station as well as the target is the local East/North (Cartesian) coordinate system, which 
is defined at the point of the Earth that touches the tangent plane. The local East 
represents the X axis and the local North the Y axis. 
Almost all calculations are performed in the flat earth coordinate system 
with the exception of the bearing to the expected target location ( expectedθ ), which is 
calculated using spherical trigonometry. expectedθ  is the EKF’s best prediction of iZ  based 
on all history previous to the thi measurement (Washburn, 1982). PACT-AKP calculates 
expectedθ  using spherical trigonometry in order to maintain measurement accuracy. For 
instance, a one degree difference between two lines of bearing (LOB) to the same target, 
one LOB calculated in spherical coordinates and the other using flat earth coordinates can 
easily over a long distance generate a lateral difference of several miles.  
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e. MTST Shock and Dimensionless Shock  
 
Figure 2.   Bearing-to-target Measurement vs. Expected Bearing-to-target.  
From Figure 2, the difference between what is actually measured ( Z ) and 
expectedθ  is called shock (S). From the measurement model Z = HX + V , the shock is the 
linear combination of the independent variables X and V. The approximate expected 
shock is 0 and the variance of S is tHΣH + R , which is the denominator of the Kalman 
gain computation, and is the means for evaluating when the shock is too large. The 
dimensionless shock (DS) is given by: 
 
2DS S≡ t -1(HΣH + R)  
 
As Washburn (2007) explains, if the shock has m components, DS should 
be a scalar random variable that has a Chi-square distribution with m degrees of freedom. 
When the DS becomes large in comparison to m, it is usually because the filter has lost 
track. PACT-AKP displays DS after updating the state of the target.  
D. PROBABILITY OF KILL CALCULATIONS 
1. Target Relative to Weapon Water Entry Point AOU 
In calculating the target’s AOU, PACT-AKP uses the covariance matrix output 
from the EKF. The AOU calculated is a 2-Sigma ellipse which is an equiprobability 






( )μ ,μx y
expectedθ
 
S S = Z - expectedθ  
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(Washburn, 1989). The ellipse has an inclination I, and semi-major axis 2s1 and a semi-
minor axis 2s2.   In calculating the dimensions of the ellipse we use the following matrix 
notation recalling that the output covariance matrix of the EKF is a 4 x 4 matrix 
consisting of 16 numbers of which we are only interested in using the upper 2 x 2 corner 
(four numbers).  
2
       
  
          
                            
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= = ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦






a    h        
h    b a + b a - bs + + h2 2




An ASROC will not hit precisely the spot at which it is aimed. The difference 
between the aim point and the water entry point is assumed to have a circular normal 
distribution with a circle error probable (ASROC CEP).  In calculating the ASROC’s fire 
error (ASROC σ), the ASROC CEP is divided by 2 ln(2) (Washburn, 2002). PACT-
AKP combines the ASROC σ with both semi-major and semi-minor axis derived from 
the EKF covariance matrix as depicted below:  
( ) ( )2 2 2 21 2+ +1 2S = s ASROCσ , S = s ASROCσ  
The resulting semi-major and semi-minor axis are modified to account for the 
ASROC fire error, thus the target’s area of uncertainty becomes relative to the ASROC 
water entry point. The importance of this transformation becomes evident in the 
probability of kill calculation by allowing for the use of Washburn’s “EllipQ” VBA 
function. EllipQ builds upon Gilliland’s power series derivations for determining the 
probability of a hit within a specified target-centered circle when it is assumed that the 
causative missile guidance error is distributed according to the bivariate normal 
distribution (Gilliland, 1962).  
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Let R be the location of the target relative to the water entry point of the weapon. 
R is a critical random variable (RV) for the kill probability calculation and its cumulative 
density function (CDF) very difficult to calculate except for in the case where 1 2S  = S . In 
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r
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Unfortunately, the problem at hand does not meet the above condition. The CDF 
of R as calculated by Washburn’s EllipQ function derived from Gilliland’s CDF of R 
derivation power series eq. 13.  Gilliland’s method can be applied to end-point accuracy 
problems entailing conditions such as the one explored in this thesis: indefinite target 
location (Gilliland, 1962). Passive target tracking does not yield an exact target location, 
but rather a target position contained within a 2-Sigma Ellipse with 86.5% probability. 
Because of this uncertainty, the indefinite target location condition is applicable and the 
aforementioned method can be exploited with slight modification so that it is applicable 
to the problem at hand, the probability of kill of a submarine when engaged with a VLA 
ASROC. 
Washburn’s EllipQ function is a fundamental building block in the process of 
calculating the target’s probability of kill. EllipQ requires three inputs. The first input is 
the lethal radius of the weapon. The second and the third inputs are  and 1 2S S  as 
calculated for determining the target relative to weapon water entry point AOU.    
2. Torpedo Effectiveness (TEFF) 
Submarine type, evasion profile, and torpedo type and torpedo running profile 
specific TEFF data generated by the Weapon Analysis Facility (WAF) was provided by 
NUWC Newport. Because this information is classified SECRET, data similar in format 
was used to exercise the PACT-AKP’s Pk algorithm. A secret version of PACT-AKP that 
considers classified TEFF data can be made available. Figure 3 is a visual display of what 




Figure 3.   TEFF Data Display. 
As observed from Figure 3, TEFF data is arranged according to angular (aspect) 
sectors defined by both their angular range and distance from center point. The center 
point (0, 0) of the graph represents the location of a particular submarine proceeding in 
the direction of the arrow. The sectors are divided into three categories: excellent, 
satisfactory, and unsatisfactory. Each sector is assigned a probability score (TEFF) that 
represents the drop zone torpedo probability of kill against the submarine. The 
probability of kill is based on which sector relative to the target the torpedo enters the 
water. 
3. Probability of Kill Calculation 
This thesis explores a unique, complex and tactically relevant problem that deals 
with target location uncertainty, weapon system fire error and a weapon system that 
cannot be described as having a lethal radius but rather a probability of kill as described 
in the TEFF section.  
Although the use of EKFs for tracking targets is not a novelty, PACT-AKP’s 
probability of kill algorithm is the only one of its kind.  
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a. Derivation and Assumptions of PACT-AKP Probability of Kill 
Algorithm 
From the TEFF data and as depicted in Figure 3, PACT-AKP uses the 
category sector distances (r) from center-point 0 0r =  to the outer radius of the thn  TEFF 
sector; n= 1,..,N. Where nr  is the outer radius of the 
thn  TEFF sector. 
Let 1 2 ( )n nQ EllipQ r , S , S= .  
Let K be the event that the ASROC kills the submarine. Figure 3 shows 
( | , ),P K r θ  where ( , )r θ  is the location of target relative to the ASROC water entry point 
in polar coordinates. In spite of the recommended “splash point,” we assume that the 
ASROC is aimed directly at the submarine (the origin in Figure 3), and that the angle θ is 
uniformly distributed  [0,  2 ]π . The logic behind these assumptions is as follows: 
(1) The submarine’s direction is unknown. Despite the best 
efforts of the TMA process, at the moment of weapon engagement it is plausible that the 
true direction of the submarine is unknown. The ASW team as well as the underwater fire 
control system may have a good idea of the general direction of the submarine, but one 
must not dismiss the possibility that the submarine may have changed course along the 
way since the last measurement. Because of this uncertainty, we assume that the 
likelihood of the submarine heading in any particular direction is the same.   
(2) The time lapsed between ASROC launch and water entry is 
minimal. Because of this assumption, leading the target will have little effect and it is 
assumed that the ASROC is much faster than the submarine.  
(3)  As depicted in Figure 3, the area comprising the “excellent 
zone” only accounts for 5.7% of the total TEFF area depicted. The maximum value of the 





⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. The probability of the ASROC hitting one of the excellent zones is the 
product of the area of the excellent zone and the density. Assume that the target relative  
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to ASROC water entry point 2-Sigma ellipse AOU dimensions are 1 2 500 ydsS S= =  , 
then the probability of hitting one of the excellent zones is only .07, even if one aims at 
the subject zone.  
Since θ  is random, the kill probability depends only on  r , the 
distance between the ASROC water entry point and the submarine. Let nP  represent the 
ring weighted TEFF score; n= 1,... N.  
2
10
1( | ) ( | ,  ) ,  for 
2n n n
P P K r P K r d r r r
π θ θπ −= = ≤ ≤∫  
In Figure 3 for example, N= 4 and 1 400r yds= , 2 600r yds= , 
3 800r yds=  and 4 1000r yds= . Also, let 1NP +  be the kill probability when the miss 
distance exceeds Nr . The kill probability in the third ring (n= 3 and 3r =  800 yards) and 
assuming that “< 30%” means 0.15 for the unsatisfactory region is: 
 
3
.6(4) .3(4) .15(8)( | ) .3,  for 600 800
16
P P K r r yards+ += = = ≤ ≤     
 
The above equation represents the weighted TEFF average for ring 
three defined by 600 800yrds r yds≤ ≤ . 1NP +  always corresponds to “unsatisfactory” in 
TEFF data, and we will always take it to be half of the given bound. Given Figure 3, 5P  
would be .15.  
b. Probability of Kill Algorithm 
PACT-AKP’s probability of kill algorithm bases its computations on the 
theory of total probability (TTP), as well as the inputs from the weighted sector TEFF 
and Washburn’s EllipQ function.   
In following the previous notation, the Pk algorithm takes as 






n n n N N
n
Pk P Q Q P Q− +
=
= − +∑   
The difference 1( )n nQ Q− − is the probability that the ASROC water entry 
point is in the thn ring.  
Although the algorithm is simple and elegant, the complexity resides in 
deriving the various elements that comprise the equation.  
Consider PACT-AKP probability of kill algorithm and the TEFF data in 
Figure 3.  If one wished to calculate the Pk for the submarine represented in Figure 3, the 







.15(16) .15,  for 0 400 .
16
.3(8) .15(8) .225,  for 400 600 .
16
.6(4) .3(4) .15(8) .3,  for 600 800 .
16
.3(8) .15(8) .225,  for 800 1000 .
16
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= 5  is the probability of kill beyond the 4  ring.th
 
 
Recall that EllipQ is a three parameter function that 
requires    and 1 2r, S S as inputs. Where r is the radius of the applicable ring and 
both   and 1 2S S are the semi-major and semi-minor axis of the target’s 2-Sigma ellipse 
AOU. Let 1 21000 yds and 500 ydsS S= = . The Pk algorithm would take on the following 



















1 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 4(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
.15(.1452) .225(.1463) .3(.1559) .225(.1427) .15(.4099)
.1951
Pk P Q P Q Q P Q Q P Q Q PQ
Pk
Pk
= − + − + − + − +
= + + + +
=
 
All TEFF data is embedded, and 1 2 and S S vary according to the EKF 
output. In addition, because all EKF calculations are performed in nautical miles, the 
input data where applicable is converted to nautical miles. 
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III. PACT-AKP PERFORMANCE TESTING 
A. SCOPE 
The correct kill probability calculation is premised on the proper tracking of the 
target. As referenced in Chapter II, the change in the state of the target is not only 
depicted in terms of its position and velocity but also described by its 2-Sigma AOU. 
Because the dimensions of the target relative to weapon water entry point 2-Sigma AOU 
semi-major and semi-minor axis are direct inputs for Washburn’s EllipQ function, it is 
necessary to verify that such inputs are consistent with what the EKF is supposed to do.    
The purpose of this chapter is to verify the proper functioning of PACT-AKP’s 
EKF. A series of performance tests are conducted to test both the measurement and 
movement models as well as the proper graphing of the target’s 2-Sigma AOU.   
B. PACT-AKP MEASUREMENT MODEL PERFORMANCE TEST 
1. Target Position Guess Reliability Test 
The target’s initial position guess will remain constant at Cardinal Coordinates (0, 
0) as well as the area reference point at (35N/120E).  As described in Chapter II, the 
initial hard-coded covariance matrix that describes the reliability of the “target position 
guess” is pre-established to be 5 nm. This means that if no measurements were taken and 
t remained at 0, the 2-sigma equiprobability contour describing the target state would be 
circular with a radius of 5nm. 
The aforementioned statement holds true and is displayed in Figure 4.  
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Time Late (hrs) = 0.00
Est. X = 0
Est. Y = 0
Est. position = 35-0-0 / 120-0-0
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 5.0000
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 5.0000
AOU =  78.54 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 4.   Target Position Guess AOU Display. 
2. Single Sensor Measurement Model Performance Test 
The purpose of this performance test is to exercise the measurement model of the 
EKF and verify the proper graphing of the 2-Sigma AOU.  The target’s initial position 
guess remains constant at Cardinal Coordinates (0, 0) as well as the area reference point 
at (35N/120E).  The sensor standard deviation (σ) remains constant at 1.25 degrees.   
a. PACT-AKP Measurement Model Single Sensor and Single 
Bearing-to-target AOU  
(1) Case One: North-South Measurement 
 
Measurement Station Position Cartesian Coord  
Latitude Longitude X Y Brng-to-tgt σ Time 
Deg Min Sec Deg Min Sec  Deg Deg Hr 
35 10 00 120 00 00 0 10 180 1.25 0 
Table 1.   North-South Single Sensor Bearing-to-target Measurement Station Data.  
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Based on the data from Table 1 and pre-established conditions for 
this performance test the following hypothesis is formulated: 
Case One Hypothesis: If PACT-AKP’s measurement model is 
processing the single bearing-to-target measurement correctly, the semi-major axis of the 
2-Sigma Ellipse AOU is larger along the bearing-to-target axis. With the sensor σ being 
1.25 degrees or .02 radians and the distance to the target at 10 nm, one would expect the 
semi-minor axis to be approximately 10 *(2*.02) = .436 nm.    
 




















Time Late (hrs) = 0.00
Est. X = 1.7797E-11
Est. Y = 3.1672E-23
Est. position = 35-0-0 / 119-59-59
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 5.0000
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 0.4347
AOU =  6.83 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 5.   North-South Single Sensor Bearing-to-target Target AOU.  
As observed from Figure 5 and consistent with data from Table 1, 
the measuring station is located at coordinate (0, 10) with a bearing-to-target 
measurement of 180 degrees. The resulting 2-sigma AOU has the semi-major axis 
oriented along the bearing-to-target axis (Y-axis) with a dimension of 4.9 nm and a semi-
minor axis of length .435. The hypothesis is not rejected. 
(2) Case Two: East-West Measurement.  The same performance 
test and hypothesis as in case one applies to this case. This case uses measuring station 
data prescribed in Table 2.  
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Measurement Station Position Cartesian Coord  
Latitude Longitude X Y Brng-to-tgt σ Time 
Deg Min Sec Deg Min Sec  Deg Deg Hr 
35 00 00 119 47 45 10 0 270 1.25 0 
Table 2.   East-West Single Sensor Bearing-to-target Measurement Station Data. 
The location of the measuring station is at (10, 0) and the bearing-
to-target measurement is 270 degrees. The results are depicted in Figure 6.  
 




















Time Late (hrs) = 0.00
Est. X = 1.0215E-05
Est. Y = -0.0101071
Est. position = 34-59-59 / 119-59-59
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 5.0000
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 0.4347
AOU =  6.83 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 6.   East-West Single Sensor Bearing-to-target Target AOU.     
From Figure 6, the semi-major axis is oriented along the bearing-
to-target axis (X-axis). Because the same conditions regarding the sensor sigma as in case 
one have not changed, the semi-minor axis’ dimensions are proportionally equivalent. 
The hypothesis is not rejected. 
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b. PACT-AKP Measurement Model Single Bearing-to-target 
Position Test 
Although the MTST measurement model performs all calculations on a 
flat earth it still accounts for the curvature of the earth when ascertaining the position of 
the target. If the measurement model is being implemented correctly this adjustment 
takes place at the Y axis coordinate of the target’s position. Table 3 depicts the measuring 
station data used to conduct this performance test.  
 
Measurement Station Position Cartesian Coordinates  
Latitude Longitude X Y Brng-to-tgt σ Time 
Deg Min Sec Deg Min Sec  Deg Deg Hr 
35 00 00 119 00 00 49.1 0 270 5 0 
Table 3.   Target Position Test Measuring Station Data. 
After processing the data from Table 3, PACT-AKP estimates the position 
of the target to be located at (0, -.06). The negative coordinate in the Y axis is consistent 
with an adjustment for the earth’s curvature. Based on these results one can not reject the 
hypothesis that the measurement model is functioning correctly.    
3. Multiple Sensor Measurement Model Performance Test 
The purpose of this test is to verify that PACT-AKP’s measurement model is able 
to process more than one bearing-to-target measurement. The target’s initial position 
guess will remain constant at Cardinal Coordinates (0, 0) as well as the latitude / 
longitude reference point at (35N/120E).  The sensor standard deviation (σ) varies 
between 1.25 and 5 degrees.  
 24
a. Two Sensor Measurement Model Test 
Table 4 depicts the measuring station data and Figure 7 the graphical 
display of the AOU.  As it can be observed, the two measurements are orthogonal with 




Measurement Station Position Cartesian Coord  
Latitude Longitude  
Brng-to-
tgt σ Time  
Deg Min Sec Deg Min Sec X Y Deg Deg Hr 
1 35 10 00 120 00 00 0 10 180 5 0 
2 35 00 00 119 47 45 10 0 270 1.25 0 
Table 4.   Multiple Sensors Measuring Station Data. 
 






















Time Late (hrs) = 0.00
Est. X = 1.1095E-06
Est. Y = -0.0101072
Est. position = 34-59-59 / 119-59-59
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 1.6478
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 0.4347
AOU =  2.25 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 7.   Two Sensor Measurement Target AOU. 
From Figure 7, PACT-AKP estimates the position of the target to be at (0, 
-.01). In the case where no measurements were taken (Figure 4) the 2-sigma AOU had a 
radius of 5 nm, however, with two independent orthogonal measurements and different 
measurement accuracies the 2-sigma AOU becomes elliptical with a semi-major axis of 
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1.65 nm and semi-minor axis of .43 nm. The semi-major axis is oriented along the 
bearing-to-target measurement with the largest measurement error. On the other hand, if 
both bearing-to-target measurements shared the same sensor measurement error, the 2-
sigma AOU would be circular with dimensions varying according to the sensor accuracy.   
C. PACT-AKP MOVEMENT MODEL PERFORMANCE TEST 
1. Change in Time Movement Model Test 
The purpose of this performance test is to ensure that the dimensions of the 
target’s AOU increase symmetrically with the passage of time given that no bearing-to-
target measurements are taken. The target position guess is established at Cardinal 
Coordinates (0, 0) at start time 0. Table 5 depicts the results.  
 
Time (Hr) Semi-major Axis (Nm) Semi-Minor Axis (Nm) 
0 5 5 
1 11.7 11.7 
2 15.7 15.7 
3 18.6 18.6 
4 21.1 21.1 
Table 5.   Change in Time 2-Sigma AOU Expansion. 
As observed from Table 5, the 2-sigma AOU expands symmetrically with time.   
D. PACT-AKP EKF PERFORMANCE TEST  
The purpose of this performance test is to exercise PACT-AKP’s EKF to ensure 
that it’s not only able to track a target, but also able to graph its corresponding AOU 
given multiple bearing-to-target measurements at different times with heterogeneous 
sensor bearing-to-target errors. This performance test is the most complex of all because 
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it involves simulating a moving target. For the purpose of this performance test, the 
generated target starts at (0, 0) and travel in a straight line from West to East at a speed of 
7kts. Actual Target track information is depicted in Table 6. In terms of measurement 
station bearing-to-target information, to ensure that PACT-AKP is able to track the target, 
three bearing-to-target cases are explored. In all three cases, PACT-AKP processes 
bearing-to-target measurements that modify the “true” bearing-to-target measurement by 
adding an error that is normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation of 5 
degrees. Measurement station data is depicted in Table 7. 
1. Composite EKF Performance Test  
True target location data is depicted in Table 6 and measurement station data is 







Hr Deg Min Sec Deg Min Sec X Y 
0 35 00 00 120 00 00 0 0 
1 35 00 00 119 51 25 7 0 
2 35 00 00 119 42 50 14 0 
3 35 00 00 119 34 15 21 0 
Table 6.    Actual Target Track Data. 
As depicted in Table 6, the target travels on a straight line at a speed of 7kts. At 
time 0, the target is located at origin (0, 0), but after a change of three time periods (3 hrs) 





Coordinates of the 
Measurement 
Station  “Truth” Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 σ Time 
 
X Y Deg Deg Deg Deg Deg Hr 
1 0 10 180 180 185 182 5 0 
2 10 0 270 271 268 275 5 0 
1 7 10 180 178 176 182 5 1 
2 17 -10 315 316 311 315 5 1 
1 14 10 180 195 186 181 5 2 
2 24 -10 315 315 316 317 5 2 
1 21 10 180 180 181 172 5 3 
2 31 0 270 270 276 265 5 3 
Table 7.   Measurement Station Data (Heterogeneous Sensor Error). 
Table 7 depicts the measuring station positions at the time bearing-to-target 
measurements are taken. Because there is no passive signal generated by the target the 
positions of the measuring stations were determined so that plausible bearing-to-target 
measurements could be generated given the known time dependent target position.  For 
contrast purposes the column labeled “truth” represents the “true” bearing-to-target 
measurement.  
The end purpose of this test is to explore whether or not the various case scenario 
position estimate 2-sigma AOUs contain the true target. The true target position is 
depicted as a green diamond while the estimated target position is depicted as a smaller 
red diamond. 
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Time Late (hrs) = 0.00
Est. X = 0.00023317
Est. Y = 0.14651732
Est. position = 35-0-8 / 119-59-59
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 1.6588
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 1.6372
AOU =  8.53 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 8.   Case One Scenario at Time 0 After the First Two Measurements. 
Figure 8 displays case one target position estimate after processing the first two 
bearing-to-target measurements. In this case, the 2-sigma AOU contains the true target 
position.   
 






















Time Late (hrs) = 0.00
Est. X = -0.7997028
Est. Y = -0.3336951
Est. position = 34-59-39 / 120-0-58
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 1.8119
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 1.6077
AOU =  9.15 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 9.   Case Two Scenario at Time 0 After the First Two Measurements.  
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Figure 9 depicts the 2-sigma AOU and estimated target position at time 0 for the 
case two scenario bearing-to-target measurements. In this case, the 2-sigma AOU 
contains the true target position.   
 






















Time Late (hrs) = 0.00
Est. X = -0.2828151
Est. Y = 0.78821559
Est. position = 35-0-47 / 120-0-20
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 1.7123
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 1.6304
AOU =  8.77 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 10.    Case Three Scenario at Time 0 After the First Two Measurements. 
Figure 10 displays PACT-AKP’s target position and 2-sigma AOU estimate for 
case three scenario at time 0 after processing the first two bearing-to-target 
measurements. In this case, the 2-sigma AOU contains the true target position.   
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Time Late (hrs) = 1.00
Est. X = 6.66366676
Est. Y = 0.63685082
Est. position = 35-0-38 / 119-51-51
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 3.4457
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 1.5892
AOU =  17.20 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 11.   Case One Target Track at Time 1 After Four Bearing Measurements. 
Figure 11 displays the case one estimated target position after processing four 
measurements. In this case, the 2-sigma AOU contains the true target position.   
 






















Time Late (hrs) = 1.00
Est. X = 6.65265185
Est. Y = -1.0448142
Est. position = 34-58-57 / 119-51-52
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 2.9839
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 1.6519
AOU =  15.49 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 12.   Case Two Scenario at Time 1 After Four Bearing Measurements. 
Figure 12 depicts PACT-AKP’s target position and 2-sigma AOU estimate for the 
bearing-to-target measurement for case two after four measurements. In this case the 2-
sigma AOU contains the true target position. 
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Time Late (hrs) = 1.00
Est. X = 6.05803312
Est. Y = 0.86020986
Est. position = 35-0-51 / 119-52-36
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 3.3294
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 1.5956
AOU =  16.69 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 13.   Case Three Scenario at Time 1 After Four Measurements. 
Figure 13 displays the target’s position and 2-sigma AOU estimation for the case 
three scenario at time 1. In this case the 2-sigma AOU contains the true target position. 
 






















Time Late (hrs) = 2.00
Est. X = 11.8290465
Est. Y = 2.21752593
Est. position = 35-2-13 / 119-45-33
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 3.3359
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 1.7220
AOU =  18.05 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 14.   Case One Scenario at Time 2 After Six Measurements. 
Figure 14 depicts PACT-AKP’s target position estimation for case one at time 
two. As depicted, the target’s true position is NOT contained by the 2-sigma AOU. 
 32
PACT-AKP processed a bearing-to-target measurement (195 degs) that we know is bad. 
At this point, PACT-AKP does not know any better since it has only processed six 
measurements. We can expect to notice a high dimensionless shock for one of the 
subsequent measurements.  
 






















Time Late (hrs) = 2.00
Est. X = 12.9313927
Est. Y = 1.2026331
Est. position = 35-1-12 / 119-44-12
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 3.5310
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 1.7906
AOU =  19.86 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 15.   Case Two Scenario at Time 2 After Six Measurements. 
Figure 15 depicts the case two scenario target position and 2-sigma AOU 
estimation after six bearing-to-target measurements. As observed, the 2-sigma AOU 
contains the target the true target’s position.   
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Time Late (hrs) = 2.00
Est. X = 13.2469997
Est. Y = 1.30812023
Est. position = 35-1-18 / 119-43-49
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 3.3925
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 1.5289
AOU =  16.29 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 16.   Case Three Scenario at Time 2 After Six Measurements. 
Figure 16 depicts PACT-AKP’s estimation of the target’s position and 2-sigma 
AOU when processing the case three scenario bearing-to-target measurements. In this 
case the 2-sigma AOU contains the true target position. 
 






















Time Late (hrs) = 3.00
Est. X = 19.3583488
Est. Y = -0.0893654
Est. position = 34-59-54 / 119-36-22
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 2.3491
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 1.3632
AOU =  10.06 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 17.   Case One Scenario at Time 3 After Six Measurements. 
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Figure 17 displays PACT-AKP’s estimation of the target’s position and 2-sigma 
AOU at time 3 for case one after six bearing measurements. The true target position is 
contained within the 2-sigma AOU.  
 






















Time Late (hrs) = 3.00
Est. X = 20.0219172
Est. Y = 1.09889013
Est. position = 35-1-5 / 119-35-33
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 1.8928
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 1.4852
AOU =  8.83 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 18.   Case Two Scenario at Time 3 After Six Measurements. 
Figure 18 depicts the target position and 2-sigma AOU estimation for case two 
scenario bearing-to-target measurements at time 3. In this case the 2-sigma AOU contains 
the true target position.  
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Time Late (hrs) = 3.00
Est. X = 20.9143014
Est. Y = -0.8661544
Est. position = 34-59-8 / 119-34-28
AOU Semi-major Axis (Nm) = 1.8684
AOU Semi-minor Axis (Nm) = 1.3783
AOU =  8.09 sq. nmi.
PK
 
Figure 19.   Case Three Scenario at Time 3 After Six Measurements. 
Figure 19 shows PACT-AKP’s target position and 2-sigma AOU estimation for 
case three scenario bearing-to-target measurements after six measurements. The 
generated 2-sigma AOU contains the target.  
In 11 out of 12 (91.6%) scenario cases, the generated 2-sigma AOU contains the 
“true” target. This phenomenon can be attributed to the fact that the initial position guess 
and the target’s initial position are the same. In addition, this test deals with a target that 
makes no course changes while PACT-AKP’s MTST movement model expects two 
course changes per hour. In theory, the true position should be in the AOU 86.5% of the 
time.  
2. Dimensionless Shock (DS) Test 
Another effective measure of EKF performance is evaluating the average 
dimensionless shock (DS) for all case scenarios. The average DS is expected to be one if 
the EKF is tracking a target that is behaving in accordance with the MTST movement 
model. Recall that PACT-AKP assumes the target makes two course changes in a one 
hour period. For this performance test, the simulated target is assumed to travel in a 
straight line (no course changes) from West to East for a period of three hours. According 
to PACT-AKP’s MTST movement model, PACT-AKP’s EKF expects the target to 
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change course no less than six times.  By assuming the target travels on a straight line, we 
are not only lying to the EKF but surprising enough we are doing the EKF a favor.  
Because of the simulated target’s travel profile, one would expect the average DS to be 
less than one for all three scenarios. An average DS of less than one entails that PACT-
AKP’s EKF is having no trouble tracking a target. The measurement dimensionless 
shocks and their averages for all case scenarios are depicted in Table 8.  
 
Measurement Dimensionless Shock 
Measurement # Case One Case Two Case Three 
1 0 .1 .02 
2 0.004 .03 .11 
3 1.51 1.99 1.37 
4 0.08 .01 .06 
5 0.7 1.27 2.37 
6 0.52 .8 .17 
7 3.31 2.14 2.65 
8 0.04 .03 .06 
AVERAGE 0.77 .8 .85 
Table 8.   Measurement Dimensionless Shocks. 
Table 8 depicts the dimensionless shocks for all eight measurements processed in 
the sensor performance test. Dimensionless shock is an effective metric for ascertaining 
the accuracy of the bearing-to-target measurement in terms of what the EKF expects 
according to the conditions established in the MTST movement model. In essence, it’s a 
good indication of whether or not the EKF is maintaining track of the target. When 
processing a measurement the goal is for the DS to be as close to zero as possible. As 
observed, the average DS for scenario one is .77, which indicates that the EKF is doing a 
better job at tracking the target than the other two scenarios despite its measurement 
seven having the largest DS. Recall, that measurement five was a bad bearing-to-target 
input, and when the operator inputs the correct bearings for the next measuring period it 
temporarily throws the EKF a “curve ball.”  PACT-AKP deemed measurement seven 
somewhat inaccurate as denoted by its DS. Scenarios two and three both have average 
dimensionless shocks of less than .9, which indicates that PACT-AKP’s EKF is on 
average having little difficulty tracking the target.  
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E. PACT-AKP PROBABILITY OF KILL ALGORITHM TEST 
The most unique feature of PACT-AKP is its kill probability function. As 
explained in Chapter II, the main inputs to the Pk algorithm from the EKF are the target 
relative to weapon water entry point AOU semi-major and semi-minor axis.  Table 9 
depicts the various “target relative to weapon water entry point” AOU dimensions for the 
target state estimations calculated in the composite EKF case two scenario heterogeneous 
sensor error performance test. The weapon’s CEP is assumed to be 400 yards and the 
TEFF data used in this test is as shown in Figure 3 and annotated in Table 10.  
 
Target Relative to Weapon Water Entry Point AOU (Case Two Scenario) 
Measurement Time Semi-major Axis (Nm) Semi-minor Axis (Nm) 
0 1.81 1.61 
1 2.99 1.66 
2 3.54 1.8 
3 1.9 1.49 
Table 9.   Case Two Scenario Target Relative to Weapon Water Entry Point AOU Data. 
 
 
nr  Yards Nautical Miles nP   
1r  400 .1975 1P  .15 
2r  600 .29624 2P  .225 
3r  800 .39499 3P  .3 
4r  1000 .49374 4P  .225 
 5P  .15 
Table 10.   Converted TEFF Data.  
Table 10 shows the weighted average of the TEFF scores per region. The 
weighted TEFF score averages along with their distances from weapon water entry point  
 
 38
are the building blocks of the Pk algorithm. The target relative to ASROC water entry 
point 2-sigma AOU (heterogeneous sensor error) case two scenario data is depicted in 





“ 1S ”(Nm) 
Semi-minor Axis 
“ 2S ” (Nm) 
AOU Area (Nm²) 
0 1.81 1.61 9.19 
1 3 1.66 15.59 
2 3.54 1.8 19.97 
3 1.9 1.49 8.92 
Table 11.   Target relative to Torpedo Water Entry Point AOU Data. 
Based on the data from Table 10 and Table 11, the resulting measurement time 
specific Pk results are depicted in Table 12.  
 





Table 12.   Pk Results.  
The probability of kill results as depicted in Table 12, show that the Pk against the 
submarine is at its highest at time 3 when the 2-sigma AOU area is at its smallest. These 
results show a relationship between the area of the 2-sigma AOU and Pk value 
highlighting the importance of not only the sensor accuracy, but also the frequency and 
number of bearing measurements.   
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In addition, suppose that 1S  = 2S for values ranging from 1S  = 2S = 0 to 1S  = 2S = 
.5 nm. Recall that the CEP of the weapon is 400 yards or .197 nm. The Pk results are 
depicted in Table 13 and Figure 20.  
 






















Table 13.   Circular 2-Sigma AOU Probability of Kill Results.    
Table 13 shows that the submarine’s probability of kill is at its highest when 1S  = 
















Figure 20.   Pk vs. S1.  
As observed from Figure 20, a small 2-sigma AOU may be in some cases 
detrimental because the ASROC will land too close to the origin, likewise, if the area of 
uncertainty is too large the value of the Pk will be low. In figure 20, a maximum Pk of 
.2101 is achieved when the 2-sigma area of uncertainty is between 173 and 195 yards². 
As grim as this result may be, one must keep in mind that torpedo TEFF data varies 
according to the type and evasion profile of the submarine as well as the type of torpedo 
and torpedo run settings.  Depending on the torpedo effectiveness scores associated with 





This thesis explores and answers a critical tactical decision aid requirement that is 
currently required by the surface Navy fleet; the probability of kill for VLA ASROC 
torpedo launch. PACT-AKP makes use of Kalman filter theory. Numerous other naval 
systems employ Kalman filters and variations of such, but what makes this thesis unique 
is the derivation of the probability of kill algorithm. Anti-submarine warfare operations 
are complex and beset with uncertainty. ASW operators have to not only contend with a 
dynamic battle space, but also with a myriad of other factors that often make anti-
submarine warfare operations overwhelming exercises of educated guessing. The work 
developed in this thesis aids in bounding this uncertainty by tackling and solving the 
uncertainty surrounding the probability of kill for VLA ASROC torpedo launch.  The 
passive contact tracker and probability of kill TDA developed in this thesis provides the 
commander with a tool capable of assessing the ASW deliberate attack engagement 
success, thus, providing him the knowledge necessary to better make decisions 
concerning limited shipboard ASW munitions expenditure.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE AREAS OF STUDY 
PACT-AKP does not address optimal weapon load-out problems. The following 
ASW relevant area of future study is recommended:  
1. Implement PACT-AKP calculated Pk to determine combatant commander 
area of responsibility (AOR) VLA ASROC inventory requirements through 
campaign modeling. 
2. Explore optimal shipboard VLA ASROC inventory using Pk values and 
expected mission assignment.   
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3. Although PACT-AKP bases its computations of Pk on the assumption that the 
ASROC is aimed directly at the target, improvements may be possible by 
choosing other aimpoints.  
C. CONCLUSIONS 
PACT-AKP is an innovative and unique tactical decision aid that helps the 
commander make better informed decisions regarding the expenditure of limited ASW 
munitions. PACT-AKP enhances the TMA process by providing a mathematically sound 
platform from which the ASW Officer and commander alike can individually track a 
submarine based on passive bearing-to-target measurements, and compare the tracking 
results to the pencil and paper target motion analysis performed by the ASW team.  
Overall, PACT-AKP not only addresses a tactically ASW relevant problem, but 
also in the process of doing so, it provides the commander with an alternative method of 
performing TMA and target kill probability knowledge before the expenditure of VLA 
ASROC munitions.  The probability of kill algorithm developed herein is unique and will 
provide a credible foundation for the development of future Navy-wide ASW doctrine 
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